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Abstract
Basic income is likely to gain momentum as the next social welfare trend to sweep over the world with ideas of how to
improve the fairness and efficiency of distributing money. Other earlier movements with similar ambitions to transform
societies, ranging across the political spectrum from socialism to neo-liberalism, have led to very different consequences
for strata of citizens, but have in common that they have de-prioritised gender equality in favour of other interests. Advo-
cates of basic income suggest that in addition to pragmatic gains, such as a more efficient state administration, primarily
a basic income will empower citizens, leading to the potential for greater human flourishing. Our question is whether this
empowerment will be gendered and if so, how? So far, the basic income debate addresses gender only in so far as it would
raise the income of the poorest, of whom a larger proportion are women. However, it is less clear how it might contribute
to a transformation of gendered behaviour, making possible divergent shapes of life where binary and set notions of gen-
der are not a restriction.We discuss the idea of basic income from a perspective of gender equality in the Swedish context.
Keywords
basic income; empowerment; feminism; gender equality; parental leave; Sweden; universal worker model
Issue
This article is part of the issue “Gender Equality and Beyond: At the Crossroads of Neoliberalism, Anti-Gender Movements,
‘European’ Values, and Normative Reiterations in the NordicModel”, edited by LenaMartinsson (University of Gothenburg,
Sweden), Diana Mulinari (Lund University, Sweden) and Katarina Giritli Nygren (Mid Sweden University, Sweden).
© 2018 by the authors; licensee Cogitatio (Lisbon, Portugal). This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribu-
tion 4.0 International License (CC BY).
1. Introduction
Basic Income is a social welfaremovement currently gain-
ing momentum across the world. It has ambitions to
transform societies, with a particular emphasis on the
empowerment of citizens, and greater human flourish-
ing among its central goals. History shows us that a com-
mon characteristic of political movements this ambitious
is that they have tended to de-prioritise gender equality
in favour of other interests. Our question then is whether
this empowerment would be gendered, and in that case
how. Our discussion is hypothetical as basic income is
suggested and debated, but not yet implemented.
The basic income debate addresses gender in so far
that it would raise the economic situation of the poorest,
of whom a larger proportion arewomen. Thus, gendered
economic inequality may be decreased. Less clear, is
how it might contribute to a transformation of gendered
behaviour, supporting possible divergent ways of being
where binary and set notions of gender are not a restric-
tion. Of course, it would be unreasonable to expect a
basic income to be a panacea for all social ills and advo-
cates are not making such a claim.We discuss the idea of
basic income from a feminist perspective in the Swedish
context (as outcomesmay vary substantially across coun-
tries, depending not least on progress already made to-
wards gender equality). We consider that a basic income
alone is unlikely to deliver on gender equality, as whilst
it could be a necessary ‘instrument of freedom’, money
alone is not a sufficient instrument with which to realise
gender equality: other structures are also needed.
Gender equality is variously conceptualised and thus
understandings of what a gender equal world might look
like differ (see e.g., Charles & Grusky, 2004; Mandel,
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2009; Olorenshaw, 2016). In this article, we take as our
cornerstone that gender equality would be realised if
there were no difference, at the population level, in the
distribution of mothers and fathers taking parental leave
and participating in the labour market. Some parents
might contribute to this non-gendered distribution by
sharing parental leave equally, whilst others might see
a particular parent taking the majority of parental leave
days, but importantly, on average, this parent would not
be more likely to be male or female.
A universal basic income has yet to be introduced by
any national government (De Wispelaere, 2016). There
have been guaranteed minimum income experiments in
the 1970s in North America (Forget, 2011) and more
recent experiments such as in India (Davala, Jhabvala,
Mehta, & Standing, 2015). Finland had a small-scale
experiment in the field (Kela, 2016), as has Canada
(Macdonald, 2016), and Scotland is working on the fea-
sibility of a basic income experiment (Painter, Thorold, &
Cooke, 2018). Gender equality has not been the focus of
these experiments. In Sweden, a basic income is debated
in various ways; from economic calculations around its
feasibility to ideological discussions of its implication for
the meaning of work (see e.g., Ekstrand, 1996; Jansson,
2003; Kildal, 2001; Paulsen, 2010). As such, this article is
necessarily based primarily on theoretical reflections as
well as being informed by empirical research on gender
equality and policies such as parental leave that set out
to reduce gender inequalities, particularly in Sweden.
The Swedish welfare state has long been premised
on the universal (paid) worker model. Much care work
has been transferred to public services in Sweden, and so
to a certain degree is included in this definition of ‘paid
activity as work’, but this is much less true of other do-
mestic work. The universal worker model is concerned
with human dignity, the right to work and economic in-
dependence, in a way that has been neglected in recent
years, where the emphasis across the European Union
has rather been on labourmarket ‘activation’ and benefit
conditionality. The central tenet of the universal worker
model is the value to human flourishing of being engaged
in paid activity that ismeaningful to a community; and an
understanding of how core such a contribution is to so-
cial inclusion. In Sweden, this is often expressed through
the workline (’arbetslinjen’), very prominent in the be-
ginning of the 2000s, where every working-age adult is
encouraged to participate in the labourmarket, to the ex-
tent that is possible. To participate in the labour market
is also the basis for most benefits in the national social
insurance system (Socialförsäkringsutredningen, 2005).
The state is in part seen as responsible for providing indi-
viduals with the opportunity to contribute, which is im-
portant for gender equality. In this article, we explore
how this fits or not with the basic income project.
Basic income is a freedom project. The question is
whether money is sufficient to procure such freedom.
Money, a floor to stand on, surely helps, but it will not be
likely on its own to challenge norms, for example around
parenting practices. We do not operate as individuals in
isolation from structures: the structures of the house-
hold and family, community and states. A contribution
of feminist policy-making and scholarship has been the
observation that freedom of action is contingent on cer-
tain structures being in place (of which a basic income
might be one). These structures rely on state interven-
tion or ‘dictate’. It is impossible to entirely escape the
norms, which govern our behaviour, but we can—and
frequently do—use the state to help shape new norms.
We consider which ‘structures’ are useful to the project
of gender equality, and ask how compatible they might
be with a basic income.
The article begins with a discussion of the universal
basic income and gender equality. Then we explore that
the conditions for ‘real freedom’might entail active shap-
ing of norms in a society and that the state may have a
role to play here, beyond the basic income instrument.
We bring examples of Swedish interventions, which have
the aim of reducing gender inequalities.
2. Universal Basic Income from a Feminist Perspective
A universal basic income can be defined as ‘an income
paid by a political community to all its members on an in-
dividual basis, without means test or work requirement’
(VanParijs, 2004, p. 8; see alsoVanParijs&Vanderborght,
2017).Whilst not a new idea per se, basic incomeas a pol-
icy proposal can be said to be one of the few truly radi-
cal shake-ups to welfare systems currently beingmooted
by actors across the political spectrum (Reed & Lansley,
2016). A key contrast between the basic income model
andmost current social welfaremodels is that those con-
sidered of core working age, and able to be actively seek-
ing employment, would also receive such paymentswith-
out means test or work requirement. This would include
parents and other carers (Van Parijs, 2004). At its ideo-
logical core is a call for liberation, for ‘real freedom’ for
all living within a given political community (Van Parijs &
Vanderborght, 2017, chapter 1).
Many claims are made on what a basic income
might achieve. Claims for a basic income include re-
ducing poverty and benefit traps, cutting bureaucracy,
matching security systems to better correspond with
changes inworking life, increasingwages, supporting cre-
ativity and entrepreneurship, reducing unhealthy depen-
dencies within relationships, increasing wellbeing, and
the list continues (Kela, 2016). Some also claim that a
basic income would reduce gender inequalities in soci-
ety (McKay, 2001). However, the basic income move-
ment makes no claims to be an explicitly feminist project
(whilst acknowledging there are various feminisms).
In some ways, a basic income would be similar to
existing ‘cash for care’ policies, which are not generally
associated with increased gender equality (e.g. Mandel,
2009). In part, this is because such cash benefits reduce
political pressure to provide comprehensive care, educa-
tion and health services. Although advocates of a basic in-
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come are clear that a basic income only replaces benefits
up to that amount, and in no way replaces existing ser-
vices, it is quite common in parental leave policy debates,
that cash benefits are explicitly used instead of provid-
ing care services for very young children (e.g., Kurowska,
2019). The concern is that should such political trade-offs
around resources occur, and should a basic income be
seen as a replacement for early years education and care
services as political compromise kicks in, this would have
significant gendered implications.
The central question asked by those sceptical of the
viability of a basic income is how the costs incurredwould
be borne by a society, initially and over time. In terms of
the level of payment, Van Parijs and Vanderborght (2017)
suggest a quarter of GDP per capitamight be appropriate.
For Sweden in 2017, this would amount to 114 450 SEK
yearly (approximately €950 monthly). The recent Swiss
Referendum in 2016 suggested 2,500 Swiss francs (ap-
proximately €2,155) per month. The Finnish experiment
lands at €560monthly, which is not sufficiently high to be
considered a basic income in the sense suggested by its
advocates. It is likely that a basic income payment would
indeed be quite low due to the demands even a guaran-
teed minimum income would make on any tax base (To-
bin, 1970). As such, other possibilities for funding might
include changes to the tax treatment of capital or bank-
ing onpublic ownership of natural resources (Van Parijs &
Vanderborght, 2017). In the case that the payment was
relatively low, such as is typically the case for ‘cash for
care’ policies, this has been associated with women be-
coming more rather than less financially dependent on
their male partners (e.g. Mandel, 2009). Similarly, evi-
dence from the Canadian guaranteed annual income ex-
periment suggestsmothers took longermaternity leaves,
leading to increased economic dependency on theirmale
partners (Forget, 2011).
Policies can be multi-dimensional in the way that
they support citizens, going beyond financial support and
services. Taking parental leave as an example, this is a
policy—in the Swedish context at least—that aims to
tackle gendered patterns of behaviour, by promoting fa-
thers’ involvementwith small children to a greater extent
thanmight occur in the absence of the policy instrument
(e.g. the daddy quota) (Castro-García & Pazos-Moran,
2016; Duvander & Johansson, 2012; Haas & Rostgaard,
2011). Parental leave is also a form of employment pro-
tection, and originally was a key determinant for women
being able to keep an attachment to the labour force af-
ter becoming parents (Cedstrand, 2011). It is also cred-
itedwith changing norms andbehaviours. In Sweden, the
reserved part for each parent in the parental leavewas in-
tensively debatedwhen first introduced in the 1990s, but
then extended without almost any debate in the 2000s
(Cedstrand, 2011). So basic income poses a risk in its sim-
plicity if there is the possibility that it might replacemore
complex policy instruments with financial benefit alone.
A basic income could potentially reduce unhealthy
dependencies both within personal relationships and
with employers. A worry however is that a basic income
might be seen to reinforce barriers to the labour market
for those who might most benefit from it (drawing upon
the universal model of inclusion). Linked to this, there
might also be less political pressure to safeguard routes
into training essential for social mobility and integration
(e.g., of migrant workers) (Hassel, 2017). Gender income
gaps related to the differential return to work of moth-
ers following childbirth may also become less of a politi-
cal concern. This may also enhance social class and other
differences between groups in any given society, calling
for an intersectional analysis.
Whilst individualised basic income payments could
well be an instrument of freedom to live individually for
some, it is likely that many of us would still be living in
households, and that many decisions (such as the divi-
sion of paid and unpaid labour) would still likely bemade
at the household or wider extended family level.Whilst a
basic income would provide women with unconditional
income and thus recognise the social value of (gendered)
caregiving (Fitzpatrick, 1999; McKay, 2001, 2005; Zelleke,
2011), it might also risk reinforcing gendered practices,
and thus further entrench gender inequalities and main-
tain financial dependency within personal relationships
(Robeyns, 2001). A basic income could contribute to
poverty alleviation and personal independence for some,
but it might also reinforce withdrawal from the labour
market and public life for certain groups, such as moth-
ers of young children, in so far as financial decisions were
still taken at household level (Fitzpatrick, 1999).
3. Basic Income: A Necessary but not Sufficient
Instrument of Freedom
Under practically any imaginable basic-income re-
form, women would benefit far more than men,
whether in terms of income or in terms of life options.
(Van Parijs & Vanderborght, 2017, p. 185)
Women would disproportionately benefit from such an
individual payment. So, why do some feminists feel un-
easy about the prospect? What is the problem with
wholeheartedly endorsing such a project? We suggest
that the extension ‘in terms of life options’, might not be
so obvious, at least if care work is part of the equation
for a given individual.
A basic income is seen by its advocates as an instru-
ment of freedom. If a basic income may entrench gen-
dered patterns, it would do so in the context of a positive
freedom. That is to say that a basic incomewould provide
a greater freedom for a range of options, and if women
‘choose’ to withdraw from the labourmarket in favour of,
for e.g., childcare, then this is quite different from a pre-
scription to be carers: or is it?What about norms and the
role of the state in shaping these? This is a feminist con-
tribution: to have shown that norms and structures mat-
ter for the decisions we make. Choices are restricted by
viable alternatives and norms of ’right choices’ are trans-
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formed into culture, traditional expectations and institu-
tions endorsing certain choices.
Eduardo Suplicy, a Brazilian basic income ‘champion’
is famous for saying ‘the best way out is through the
door’ (cited in Van Parijs & Vanderborght, 2017, chap-
ter 1). His point is that themost obvious solution is some-
times a very good solution; in the case of lack of income
being a restrictive factor for the exercise of freedom, the
obvious solution is to distribute money more effectively
and fairly so that more people can express their will to a
greater extent. For basic income activists this translates
as a payment, which is individualised, universal and un-
conditional. For feminism, there is perhaps a different,
also obvious solution (men need to share the unpaid do-
mestic and caring work), and it is not likely to be deliv-
ered by a basic income alone.
Basic income seeks to support our ambitions, with-
out dictating what these should be. It makes the as-
sumption that the power differential would be suffi-
ciently shifted by the individualised payment to women
for them to negotiate different domestic arrangements,
and that norms would be flexible enough to accommo-
date a greater—and less gendered—range of ‘life op-
tions’. The experience of the Belgium time credit scheme
does not bodewell in this regard. The time credit scheme
allowed people a limited amount of paid time away from
work, for any purpose. It was a seemingly gender-neutral
scheme. However, it has seen extremely gendered use
in practice. Mothers (but not fathers) in Belgium have
overwhelmingly used their time credit account to care
for children, in effect as an extension of parenting leave
(Deven & Merla, 2019). Perhaps another example is the
completely gender-neutral parental leave in Sweden: de-
spite there being individual parallel rights for two par-
ents, gendered practice endures, with women using the
lion’s share of leave. These experiences suggest that for
a basic income to have an impact on the gendered prac-
tices of parenting, further thought would have to be
given to how to achieve that specific goal. Gender equal-
ity is not a primary aimof a basic income, but it is a hoped
for secondary consequence. Parental leave scholarship
suggests that gender equality is most efficiently a con-
sequence when it is an explicit policy aim, but that, as
described above, even then it might fail to materialise.
Perhaps considering the distinction between gender
equality and gender equity is helpful here. Gender eq-
uity is the value-laden concept that stems from the so-
cially constructed expectations of female and male be-
haviour, which is based both on gender stratification
and gender roles (Fraser, 1994). Gender equity is thus
based on the experience of fairness and whose values
are valuable, whereas gender equality would be easier
defined by quantitativemeasures of gendered division of
time and rewards of paid and unpaid work. Fraser (1994)
would say that gender equality depends on female be-
haviour becoming the norm. Basic income has the poten-
tial to change the meaning of gender equity, either re-
versing back towards traditional gendered expectations,
or alternatively liberating us from such stratifications and
norms that limit our behaviour. There aremany factors in
hypothesising is such outcomes, but it seems clear that a
basic income set at too lowa payment ratewould reverse
development by necessity.
Firestone (1970, p. 1) observed that:
Sex class is so deep as to be invisible…the reaction of
the commonman, woman, and child—That?Why you
can’t change that!...This gut reaction, the assumption
about changing a fundamental biological condition, is
an honest one….That so profound a change cannot be
easily fit into traditional categories of thought, e.g.,
“political,” is not because these categories do not ap-
ply but because they are not big enough: radical fem-
inism bursts through them.
As with other big political movements, the basic income
project does not appear to be ‘big enough’, remaining rel-
atively conservative and essentialist with regard to its un-
derstanding of gender equalities. Perhaps it is precisely
because a basic incomewould be such a revolutionary ex-
pansion of freedom, that this core unchallenged gender
binary worldview is all the more disappointing. An inde-
pendent source of income is a good start on the road to
freedom, but, it is not a sufficient condition to challenge
the persistent norms and prevailing gendered structures.
To the extent that gender is based on norms and struc-
tures, which have to be challenged, basic income, as a
gender-neutral idea that hides gender, could be argued
to be a necessary condition, but not a sufficient condi-
tion to see female behaviour becoming the norm, thus
leading us towards gender equality (Fraser, 1994).
4. The Social Organisation of Parenting and Gender
Equality: Swedish Parental Leave Policy
Scholars and policy makers with an interest in how gen-
der equality might be achieved have long observed that
the social organisation of parenting and other care is the
likely key (e.g., Firestone, 1970; Fraser, 1994; Koslowski,
2008). As long as a majority of mothers retain respon-
sibility as a primary carer and a majority of fathers re-
tain responsibility as a primary provider, this gendered
split in the organisation of parenting is likely to spill over
into gender inequalities across the life course. There is
development over time, sometimes referred to as the
(incomplete) gender revolution (Gerson, 2009), where
Sweden is cast as a forerunner (Goldscheider, Bernhardt,
& Lappegård, 2015). Indeed, Sweden is often considered
one of the best places in the world to be a mother. How-
ever, also in Sweden, gender inequalities in both paid
and unpaid work remain.
Whilst there is work to do before gender equality
is fully realised in Sweden, its family policies have cer-
tainly led to high levels of female labour force partici-
pation, if also high levels of occupational sex segrega-
tion (Charles & Grusky, 2004). Historically, as elsewhere,
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Swedish mothers had been expected to withdraw from
the labour market after the birth of a child (which is no
longer the case). Parental leave has been a key institution
in the fight against discrimination; and it became a new
norm that mothers return to the workplace after a pe-
riod of parental leave. However, wheremothers, and not
so much fathers, are the ones using family friendly poli-
cies such as parental leave, this is likely to have adverse
consequences forwomen’s earning capacities (Mandel &
Semyonov, 2005).
Sweden is a pioneer of parental leave, expand-
ing leave rights to fathers, in place now since 1974
(Cedstrand, 2011). Proponents of parenting leave poli-
cies typically support the idea that gender equality re-
quires a change away from the assumption that moth-
ers have primary responsibility for childcare. Seen in this
light, parenting leave in a broad sense goes along the
same lines as basic income, proposing freedom in what
tasks are performed and by whom. The Swedish state
perceives the continued lack of equity between mothers
and fathers in leave taking as problematic and employs
reserved months to each parent as an instrument to in-
crease take up by fathers. This emphasis on supporting
men as well as womenwith parental care work has led to
changing norms, and it is today clearly normative for fa-
thers to take part of the parental leave, something 9 out
of 10 fathers do. Also, most men and women adhere to
the idea of gender equal sharing of leave (Valarino, 2019),
suggesting a trend towards female behaviour been seen
as a ‘norm’, as noted above, necessary for gender equal-
ity (Fraser, 1994). Among parents living apart, shared res-
idential custody is now increasingly common, seeing far
more involvement by fathers in childcare than in many
comparable countries. The language used in policy is now
overwhelmingly gender-neutral emphasising both par-
ents’ equal importance, but with the potential to also
hide remaining gendered behaviour.
The Swedish state can be said to have been particu-
larly proactive, or ‘hands on’ in implementing structural
changes before—and with the explicit aim—of changing
gendered parenting practices. Indeed, Sweden is used as
an illustration of how the state can change deeply rooted
gendered ideologies (and norms) over time (Mandel,
2009). However, the extent to which the state should
‘nudge’ behaviour and intervene is debated in Sweden.
A basic income may be seen as complementing a more
‘hands off’ approach.
It is also interesting to note that equal leave taking
is not evenly distributed across socio-economic status:
the fathers most likely to be using extensive lengths of
parental leave in Sweden are highly educated and with
high incomes (Duvander & Johansson, 2012). So, the so-
cial organisation of parenting is most gendered for those
most likely to benefit from a basic income, who are also
those most dependent on the availability of high quality
and affordable early years education and care. Sweden
has also been a pioneer in the availability of high qual-
ity and affordable early years education and care (ECEC),
a service highly correlated with female labour market
participation, which is well integrated with leave policy
(Viklund & Duvander, 2017).
Parental leave payment in Sweden is approximately
80% of the wage for most parents. This might not nec-
essarily be affected, in principle, by the implementa-
tion of a basic income, which could allow for the possi-
bility of differences in levels of payments for different
groups (e.g., such as fathers). Indeed, although mostly
dependent on eligibility criteria linked to employment
(given the universal worker model) parenting leave has
been seen as one of a group of measures (another be-
ing a universal state pension) moving along the path
to a basic income (Robeyns, 2001). However, as men-
tioned above, payment is only one dimension of parent-
ing leave policy. In addition, it protects women’s (and in-
creasingly men’s) position in the labour market, allow-
ing them to return to their place of employment after
a period of leave and it explicitly aims to support carers
other than the birth mother, in particular encouraging
increased care by fathers. A recent government commis-
sion on parental leave seeks to include also other carers
in parental leave use, to better enable less traditional
families (SOU, 2017).
Another aspect of current Swedish policies such as
leave measures is that these types of benefits take ac-
count of specific needs at a given time as they arise
(O’Reilly, 2008). This takes the risk away from the indi-
vidual needing to plan ahead for a rainy day when care is
required due to illness of a spouse or other family mem-
ber; or for a more happy event, such as the birth of a
child. As parental leave in Sweden is part of the national
social insurance, it is based on the general idea of spread-
ing risks over the population and the life course. It is an
interesting question whether an individual payment of a
basic income would shift such risk management back to
the individual.
Sweden is known to be a particularly normative so-
ciety, in that it is perhaps more difficult than in less nor-
mative societies (all societies are normative to some ex-
tent) to live outside the accepted ‘best practice’ norms.
This currently shows up for those outside the normative
universal worker model. Would a basic income exacer-
bate this existing social divide between those remaining
on a low level of income and those on more average or
higher levels of income? Would it create a two-tier sys-
tem: a ‘them and us’ of lower income groups reliant on
basic income and top up benefits and the higher income
groups (who possibly resent paying for it all whilst having
less ‘free’ time)?
So, the Swedish ‘universal worker’ model, or ‘work
line’, which is such a core principle ofmany policieswhich
are generally agreed to support gender equality, is pos-
sibly going to rub along as an awkward partner with a
basic income. There seems to be a fundamental ideo-
logical conflict between the two ideas, a conflict much
deeper than economic considerations of state budget, of-
ten expressed in the ‘right to work’ and also to mean-
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ingful work, not least by the trade unions, which may
undermine the universal worker model, bringing its ex-
istence into question. If the universal worker model did
not continue to hold firm, this would likely undermine
related efforts to reduce gender inequalities. Sweden
is a good case indicating that structural interventions
based around a universal workermodel are needed to re-
duce gender inequalities still today and probably far into
the future.
It is not clear that a basic income payment would
challenge gender inequalities. Indeed, it may reinforce a
(male) breadwinnermodel even in a country like Sweden
where norms are clearly moving towards gender equal
sharing; the gender wage gap would likely prevail, and
we may see a tendency towards women (in particular
mothers) quitting labour market work in favour of living
on a basic income.
5. Conclusions: Basic Income, a Radical or Conservative
Policy with Regard to Gendered Empowerment?
A basic income promises ‘real freedom’, or a freedom
from dictate; what role then for state intervention? The
interplay between social policies and norms is of key in-
terest to social scientists and policy makers. This is par-
ticularly clear in the arena of public health, in which the
interventionist state often plays a strong role in changing
our behaviours, for e.g., with regard to smoking, alcohol
consumption, vaccinations, sugar consumption. There
are other examples around environmental behaviours
too, e.g. recycling and reduced use of plastic bags and
other plastics.
Should the state not take action too with regard
to gender equalities? Norms will develop: there is no
such thing as total ‘real’ freedom. Legal frameworks how-
ever, such as parental leave policies can see changes to
norms, even those as deeply embedded as parenting
practices. In Sweden, such statements are hardly contro-
versial, but choice and gender equality are sometimes
contrasted, and the limits to state intervention are con-
stantly renegotiated.
Basic income would potentially change the bound-
aries for state intervention, which for many sounds intu-
itively positive, and may well bring many benefits. How-
ever, if the state does not intervene regarding gender-
equality, gender norms will be determined by other less
visible forces, such as the power dynamics within house-
holds. It is likely that a universal basic income has the
potential for empowerment for all, but for this to be
achieved, attention will need to be paid to its potential
for gendered outcomes.
The concerns raised here regarding the limitations
of empowerment for women from a basic income—
particularly with regard to whom remains holding the
baby, doing the majority of domestic work and the ma-
jority of both formal and informal care work—are not in
themselves arguments against the implementation of a
basic income. However, there are certainly strong rea-
sons to not let basic income replace other structures that
have been shown to be relevant for gender equality, in
particular the ones directed at supporting families, such
as parental leave and childcare services.
McLean (2015, p. 2) notes that ‘basic Income is in
some ways a microcosm of wider feminist controversies
regarding how the state can recognise the unpaid work
women largely do without reinforcing existing inequal-
ities, also known as Wollstonecraft’s Dilemma (Lister,
1995; Pateman, 1988)’. Indeed, feminists involved with
policymaking sometimes find themselves falling into one
of two camps: that of a more pragmatic approach and
that of amore idealistic approach. The former aim to take
the situation they see at a current time in front of them,
such as mothers doing most of the childcare, and to sup-
portwomen in that situation. The lattermight rather take
issue with the root imbalance of this situation and aim
to create a new situation where fathers are doing more
childcare. Arguably, many aspects of the current Swedish
welfare state are more radically ambitious than the idea
of basic income in that it seeks change to the gendered
division of both paid and unpaid work. The implemen-
tation of a basic income would be gender-neutral and so,
in theory, fathers andmothers would have the same sup-
port. In practice, however, and especially given the likely
low level of basic income, this policy might have the (un-
intended) consequence of encouraging a return to the
breadwinner model of parenting, with one parent bet-
ter able to stay at home, but another parent still need-
ing to remain firmly attached to the labour market. Once
again, we have a political movement, which has not fully
embraced the challenge from radical feminism to move
us beyond the ‘fundamental biological condition’ as ob-
served by Shulamith Firestone (1970, p. 1) towards an
equal distribution of care work.
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